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Since neither case presented an "identity of issues," the question of the effect of Cummings on the Glaser rule would seem to
remain unresolved.
ARTICLE

42-

TRIAL BY THE COURT

CPLR 4213(c): Section deemed precatory.
03
the defendant
In Allied Scrap & Salvage Corp. v. State,"
moved to vacate an award on the ground that the decision was
not rendered within sixty days after the cause was finally submitted, as provided for in CPLR 4213(c). The court, however,
noted that the provision of CPA § 442,104 providing for a new
trial if the decision were not rendered within sixty days, was
deleted from CPLR 4213(c) "because under the old rule courts
customarily denied the new trial on condition that the decision be
This deletion,
rendered within an additional specified time." '
the court surmised, made CPLR 4213(c) precatory.
Two arguments are advanced for the proposition that 4213
inust be precatory: (1) there is no method of enforcement; and
(2) assuming a means of enforcement, a judge forced to render a
decision will be prone to decide against the moving party. Both
arguments may be answered.
With respect to enforcement, the duty of a judge to render
an opinion is unquestionably a ministerial one. It would seem,
therefore, that a writ of mandamus could issue against a judge
who failed to render a decision within the sixty days provided
for in 4213.106 The court in Allied did not discount such a course
of action. As to the second argument, a decision which smacks
of abuse of discretion can always be appealed.
Thus, it would seem that there is still logical justification for
an interpretation of CPLR 4213 which would find that provision
more than a pious wish.
10326

App. Div. 2d 880, 274 N.Y.S.2d 317 (3d Dep't 1966).

104 Under CPA § 442, a court trying a case without a jury had to render
its decision "wvithin sixty days after the final adjournment of the term where
the issue was tried." Upon failure of the court to do so, either party could
move for a new trial and the court would be obliged to order a new trial
absolutely or order a new trial conditionally upon a decision not being
rendered within a specified time. In practice the section was merely precatory, since the motion for new trial was rarely granted and, instead, the
time for the court's decision was generally extended. 4 WEINSTEIN, KORN
& MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 14213.11 (1966).
10 Allied Scrap & Salvage Corp. v. State, 26 App. Div. 2d 880, 274
N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (3d Dep't 1966).

106 "[Mandamus] is a proper remedy to compel the performance of a
specific act where the act is ministerial in its character. . . ." 2 BOUVIER,
LAW DICTIONARY 2075 (9th ed. 1914). Seemingly, under CPLR 4213 the
duty would not be subject to mandamus until the sixty days had passed.

